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Abstract
We present an experimental study where we analyze three well-
known matching mechanisms￿ the Boston, the Gale-Shapley, and the
Top Trading Cycles mechanisms￿ in di⁄erent informational settings.
Our experimental results are consistent with the theory, suggesting
that the TTC mechanism outperforms both the Boston and the Gale-
Shapley mechanisms in terms of e¢ ciency and it is slightly more suc-
cessful than the Gale-Shapley mechanism regarding the proportion of
truthful preference revelation, whereas manipulation is stronger un-
der the Boston mechanism. In addition, even though agents are much
more likely to revert to truth-telling in lack of information about the
others￿payo⁄s￿ ignorance may be bene￿cial in this context￿ , the
TTC mechanism results less sensitive to the amount of information
that participants hold. These results therefore suggest that the use of
the TTC mechanism in practice is more desirable than of the others.
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11 Introduction
There is now a vast literature on matching problems. Matching is a pervasive
phenomenon arising in several economic and social settings. The assignment
of civil servants to civil service positions, the admission of students to colleges,
some entry-level labor markets￿ as the widely explored market for graduating
physicians￿ , or the school choice problem are among the matching situations
that have gained attention in the last decades. The working of some matching
mechanisms, along with strategic issues that confront individuals in these
contexts, have been explored theoretically under the assumption of complete
information.
Very brie￿ y, in a two-sided matching market, agents belong to one of
two disjoint sets, say colleges and students, and each agent￿ college and
student￿ has preferences over the other side of the market￿ students and
colleges, respectively￿ and the prospect of being unmatched. The matching
problem then reduces to assigning students to colleges by means of a match-
ing mechanism. Stability, strategy-proofness, and Pareto e¢ ciency of such
mechanisms are highly valued properties. A mechanism is stable if it always
selects stable matchings; by de￿nition, under a stable matching every agent
in the market prefers his partner to being alone and, moreover, no pair of
agents￿ consisting of a college and a student￿ who are not matched to each
other would rather prefer to be so matched. A mechanism is strategy-proof
if it is immune to preference manipulation, i.e., truth is a dominant strategy.
A mechanism is Pareto e¢ cient if it always selects Pareto e¢ cient matchings.
The perhaps most famous matching mechanism relies on the Gale-Shapley
deferred-acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Gale and Shap-
ley were motivated by the problem of the admission of students to colleges
and the Gale-Shapley algorithm was written as a means to show that a
stable matching always exists in such a two-sided matching market. The
Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance algorithm transforms a matching where
all agents are unmatched into a stable matching, thus proving existence.
Besides guaranteeing stability, the Gale-Shapley (GS) mechanism has other
appealing properties. Namely, truth is a dominant strategy for one side of the
market (Dubins and Freedman, 1981, Roth, 1982a). Moreover, it is Pareto
e¢ cient when the welfare of both sides of the market is considered (Roth,
1982a).
Most theoretical studies on matching mechanisms rely on the assumption
of complete information, however implausible: knowing the true preferences
of every agent in the market is more than we may reasonably expect in most
matching markets. Only a few papers have relaxed this assumption and are
thus worth mentioning. Roth (1989) is a ￿rst attempt to deal with the incom-
2plete information case. Under incomplete information, even though truth re-
mains a dominant strategy for one side of the market when the Gale-Shapley
mechanism is employed, the equilibrium characterization for the complete in-
formation case is not robust. Ehlers and Mass￿ (2003) study Bayesian Nash
equilibria for mechanisms producing stable matchings￿ as the Gale-Shapley
mechanism￿ and ￿nd a necessary and su¢ cient condition for truth-telling to
be an equilibrium: truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the revela-
tion game induced by a stable mechanism and a common belief if and only if
all pro￿les in its support have a singleton core. Finally, Roth and Rothblum
(1999) and Ehlers (2003, 2004) are less ambitious and do not aim at char-
acterizing equilibria, but give advice to individuals on how to participate in
matching markets when there is uncertainty about the others￿strategies.
Still, many questions regarding the strategic incentives agents face under
incomplete information remain to be answered on theoretical grounds. How
the amount of information held by individuals on the elements of the game
actually in￿ uences individuals￿decision making, a⁄ecting the performance
of matching mechanisms, is thus a question to be explored. For instance,
Barber￿ and Dutta (1995) consider truth-telling as a form of "protective"
behavior, claiming that risk averse agents may revert to faithfully revealing
their true preferences when they are poorly informed. Moreover, it is clear
that in mechanisms for which truth is not a dominant strategy, computing
the optimal strategies requires a lot of information on others￿preferences. In
this paper we present an experimental study to investigate these and other
issues, providing a direction into which the role of information on decision
making may be ascertained.
We investigate a particular class of matching problems: the assignment
of individuals to indivisible items. In these problems, individuals￿ let us call
them teachers￿ have strict preferences over the indivisible items￿ henceforth,
schools￿ and, on the other hand, schools have a maximum capacity and
a strict priority ordering of all teachers. This problem has been referred
to as the school choice problem (Abdulkadiroglu and S￿nmez, 2003) and
is closely related to the college admissions problem explored by Gale and
Shapley (Gale and Shapley, 1962), the main di⁄erence being that, in contrast
to the college admissions model, here schools are not strategic agents, but
mere objects to be assigned to teachers. Hence, while teachers may not
straightforwardly reveal their true preferences, schools have no chance of
manipulating priorities.
The in￿ uence of information is assessed for the GS mechanism and for
another well-known matching mechanism, the Top Trading Cycles (TTC)
mechanism, as well as for the Boston mechanism, which has been widely
3used in the context of school choice problems.1 The TTC (Shapley and
Scarf, 1974) ful￿lls two appealing properties￿ it is both strategy-proof (Roth,
1982b) and Pareto e¢ cient￿ but it is not stable. The GS mechanism is
both strategy-proof and stable, but not e¢ cient (Roth, 1982a), since we only
consider teachers￿welfare in this setup. Finally, we have included the Boston
mechanism for reference, as it fails to meet all three properties: it is not
strategy-proof, neither stable, nor Pareto e¢ cient. Note that, whereas the
GS mechanism fails to be e¢ cient even when agents act straightforwardly,
under the Boston mechanism e¢ ciency losses result from the fact that there is
room for pro￿table manipulation and Pareto e¢ ciency would result if agents
revealed their true preferences.2
Besides providing yet another test of theoretical results on matching
mechanisms with boundedly rational individuals, we address two main ques-
tions. First, we compare the three above mentioned mechanisms under four
informational scenarios, ranging from complete ignorance about the other
participants￿preferences and schools￿priorities to complete information on
all elements of the game. In particular, we are concerned in comparing the
incentives agents face under di⁄erent mechanisms, as well as in comparing
e¢ ciency levels and stability of the outcomes, for di⁄erent information levels.
These comparisons may have important policy implications. The results in
this paper suggest that, just as predicted by theory, the TTC mechanism
prevails over the GS in what e¢ ciency is concerned. Moreover, when agents
hold very little or full information on the elements of the game, the TTC
may be more successful than the GS in inducing truth-telling. On the other
hand, the Boston mechanism performs surprisingly well, delivering an ex-
ceptionally high proportion of stable matchings and e¢ ciency levels that are
close to those obtained under any of the two alternative mechanisms. Second,
within each mechanism, we evaluate the in￿ uence of the amount of informa-
tion held by individuals on decision making. Namely, we are concerned in
testing whether truth-telling emerges as a very salient form of behavior when
information is low. Moreover, if we are able to determine that information
signi￿cantly a⁄ects individuals￿behavior, we can immediately conclude that
the existing theoretical results, which rely on the fundamental assumption
1School choice programs have become increasingly popular in the US. The best known
of these programs rely on the so-called Boston mechanism, which was used to assign
students to schools in Boston, having been recently replaced by a mechanism based on
Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance algorithm. The Boston mechanism remains in use in
Cambridge and Seattle, among others.
2On the functioning and strategic properties of the Boston mechanism, check Abdulka-
diroglu and S￿nmez (2003), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2005), Chen and S￿nmez (2006), and
Ergin and S￿nmez (2004).
4of complete information, are insu¢ cient to deal with markets where agents
know little about others. Otherwise, if the e⁄ect of information is not rele-
vant, theory may be considered apt to deal with the incomplete information
case. Our results partially support the ￿rst conjecture: in general, there is a
large di⁄erence between scenarios where information levels are extremely low
and those where agents hold substantial levels of information, while the dif-
ferences between partial and full information scenarios are not signi￿cant. In
particular, in a very low information environment, acting straightforwardly
is a very salient form of behavior and there is a signi￿cant drop in the pro-
portion of agents who play truthfully once agents have some information on
the elements of the game. Furthermore, in low information environments,
signi￿cantly higher levels of e¢ ciency are achieved under every mechanism
except for TTC, which appears to be less sensitive to the amount of infor-
mation held by participants. Finally, our results do not disclose a signi￿cant
e⁄ect of information on the proportion of stable matchings achieved under
any of the mechanisms under study.
We are aware of several experimental studies of matching problems, some
of which aim at testing the above mentioned mechanisms. The main di⁄erence
with respect to this paper derives from our main objective: to test the role
of information in evaluating matching mechanisms. These studies include
Harrison and McCabe (1996) that explores the GS mechanism and shows
that pro￿table manipulation of agents￿preferences becomes more di¢ cult
as markets get larger; Chen and S￿nmez (2002a) that compares a random
serial dictatorship mechanism used to allocate dormitory rooms in Amer-
ican universities with a variant of the TTC in an incomplete information
environment, concluding that the TTC produces signi￿cantly more e¢ cient
allocations; in a companion paper, Chen and S￿nmez (2002b) evaluate the
performance of these mechanisms under complete information, reaching the
same qualitative results. Finally, Chen and S￿nmez (2006), consider the
school choice problem and analyze the TTC, the GS, and the Boston mech-
anisms under incomplete information, concluding that, in what e¢ ciency is
concerned, the TTC outperforms the Boston mechanism and in turn the GS
improves upon the TTC. This e¢ ciency reversal result contrasts with the re-
sults obtained in this paper. Other experimental studies, dealing with other
matching mechanisms, are: Olson and Porter (1994), Nalbantian and Schot-
ter (1995), Kagel and Roth (2000), ￿nver (2001), Haruvy, Roth, and ￿nver
(2001), and McKinney, Niederle, and Roth (2005).
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical properties
of the three matching mechanisms under study. We describe the experi-
mental design in Section 3. Section 4 summarizes the main results of the
experiments. Some concluding remarks follow in Section 5.
52 The Theoretical Model
We ￿rst introduce the model and then describe the three matching mecha-
nisms and their theoretical properties.
In this assignment problem there are a number of teachers to ￿ll a number
of vacancies or teaching positions across di⁄erent schools. Each teacher has
strict preferences over all schools, while each school has a strict priority
ranking of all teachers, as well as a maximum number of teachers to employ.
Priorities are exogenous and not subject to manipulation by schools. The fact
that only teachers can act strategically is what distinguishes this problem
from the college admissions model. It is not di¢ cult to justify the use of
the school choice model. Besides the fact that this model is easier to be
implemented in the laboratory, we can ￿nd plenty of real-life situations that
can be described as one side of the market being inactive. We have already
mentioned the use of the school choice problem in the admission of children
to public schools in the US, which also applies to other countries as Spain,
but we can also think about the admission of students to universities (which
is, in most countries, based on students￿grades), the MIR system ("MØdicos
Internos Residentes," a residence training system for physicians in public
hospitals based on their performance) in Spain, or in general the assignment
of civil servants to civil service positions (for example, teachers, judges, or
tax inspectors in Spain), which is, in several countries, based on an objective
scoring system.
The outcome of the school choice problem is a matching, an assignment of
teachers to teaching positions such that each teacher is assigned one vacancy
and each vacancy is ￿lled by one teacher only. A matching is Pareto e¢ cient
if there is no matching that assigns at least one teacher a strictly better
school and every other teacher a weakly better school, and it is stable if
every agent in the market prefers his partner to being alone and, moreover,
no pair of agents￿ consisting of a school and a teacher￿ who are not matched
to each other would rather prefer to be so matched. A matching mechanism
consists of a systematic procedure that selects a matching for each school
choice problem. A matching mechanism is e¢ cient if it always chooses Pareto
e¢ cient matchings; it is stable if it always selects stable matchings; and it is
strategy-proof if truth is a dominant strategy, i.e., no teacher can pro￿tably
manipulate her preferences, independently of the other agents￿strategies.
2.1 The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
In this context, the TTC works as follows:
61. Each school gives priority to a number of teachers up to its capacity; in
this setting, for simplicity, each teacher has priority in one school only.
2. Each teacher reports her preferences over the schools.
3. An ordering of teachers is randomly chosen.
4. For any submitted teachers￿preferences, schools￿priorities, and order-
ing of teachers, the outcome is obtained after undergoing the following
steps:
(a) Assign each teacher to a school (tentative assignment); in this
setting, each teacher is tentatively assigned to her priority school.
(b) The ￿rst teacher in the ordering proposes to her top ranked school.
If she has priority at this school, the assignment is ￿nalized and
both the teacher and teaching position are removed from the sys-
tem; the procedure continues with the second teacher in the order-
ing. Otherwise, the ￿rst teacher in the ordering that is tentatively
assigned to the proposed school is inserted at the top of the or-
dering, in front of the requester.
(c) When the ordering is modi￿ed, this procedure is repeated, so that
the teacher who just became ￿rst in the ordering sends an applica-
tion to her highest-ranked school. If she has priority at this school,
the assignment is ￿nalized and the procedure continues with the
next teacher in line. Otherwise, the ￿rst teacher in the ordering
tentatively assigned to the proposed school is inserted at the top
of the ordering, in front of the requester.
(d) If a cycle forms, it consists of a sequence of proposals of the kind:
A proposes to B￿ s tentative assignment, B applies to C￿ s tentative
assignment, and C proposes to A￿ s tentative assignment. In such
cases, all teachers in the cycle are assigned to the schools they
proposed to and teachers, as well as their respective assignments,
are removed from the system.
(e) The procedure stops when all teachers are assigned to a position.
The TTC mechanism satis￿es two appealing properties: it is strategy-
proof, i.e., truth is a dominant strategy for every teacher, and Pareto e¢ cient,
but it is not stable.3 We thus expect that individuals reveal their preferences
3Note also that, in this setting, the resulting ￿nal assignment is independent of the
random ordering of teachers de￿ned in step 3, as proved in Theorem 3 in Abdulkadiroglu
and S￿nmez (1999).
7in a straightforward manner, independently of the amount of information
they hold on the elements of the game.4 As a result, we expect to observe a
high e¢ ciency level but not necessarily a high frequency of stable outcomes.
2.2 The Gale-Shapley Mechanism
The GS mechanism is certainly one of the best known mechanisms in the
matching literature. Its theoretical properties and the incentives it gives to
agents have been scrutinized and its applications encompass a signi￿cant
number of markets. In what follows we describe the functioning of the GS
mechanism:
1. A priority ordering of teachers is determined for each school.
2. Each teacher reports her preferences over the schools.
3. Given the submitted preferences of the teachers and schools￿priority
orderings, positions are allocated after undergoing the following steps:
(a) Each teacher proposes to her ￿rst ranked school. Each school
keeps the applicants with higher priority order on hold until po-
sitions are ￿lled, while rejecting the lowest priority teachers in
excess of its capacity.
(b) In general:
Every teacher who got rejected in the previous step proposes to
the next school on her list of preferences. Each school considers
the teachers it holds from the previous step together with the new
applications. The lowest priority teachers in excess of the school￿ s
capacity are rejected, while remaining applications are kept on
hold.
(c) This process is repeated until no applications are rejected. Each
participant is then assigned the position at the school that keeps
her on hold.
As the TTC mechanism, the GS mechanism is strategy-proof. Again,
we expect individuals to faithfully reveal their true preferences over schools
4Still, Chen and S￿nmez (2002a) ￿nd, in an experiment about on-campus housing, that
about one-third of the subjects manipulate their preferences under a variant of the TTC
mechanism and Chen and S￿nmez (2006) report preference misrepresentation levels that
amount to around one-half of the subjects.
8in every informational treatment.5 This mechanism is e¢ cient when the
welfare of both sides of the market is taken into account. Nevertheless, in this
assignment problem, schools are mere objects to be allocated among teachers
and only teachers￿welfare is taken into consideration in the determination of
the e¢ ciency level. Since there may exist a matching that Pareto dominates
the outcome of the GS mechanism for teachers, the mechanism is not e¢ cient
in this setup. It follows that, if theory is to be con￿rmed, the TTC should
outperform the GS in e¢ ciency terms. On the other hand, when considering
stability, theory predicts that the occurrence of stable matchings under the
GS mechanism should be more frequent than under either the TTC or the
Boston mechanisms.
2.3 The Boston Mechanism
The Boston mechanism has been the most widely used assignment mechanism
in real-life applications of school choice problems. It works as follows:
1. A priority ordering of teachers is determined for each school.
2. Each teacher reports her preferences over the schools.
3. Given the submitted preferences of the teachers and schools￿priority
orderings, positions are allocated after several rounds:
(a) Each teacher proposes to her top ranked school. Each school ac-
cepts the proposals from the teachers with higher priority order
until positions are ￿lled (or no teachers proposing to the school
remain). These applicants and their positions are removed from
the system. All other applications are rejected by the schools.
(b) In general at round k:
Each teacher remaining in the system proposes to its kth school.
Each school with vacant positions accepts the proposals from the
teachers with higher priority order until positions are ￿lled (or
no teachers proposing to the school remain in this round). These
applicants and their positions are removed from the system. All
other applications are rejected by the schools.
(c) The procedure terminates when each teacher is assigned a posi-
tion.6
5Even though Chen and S￿nmez (2006) report an experiment where more than one-
third of the participants manipulate their preferences.
6Hence, if there are n teachers and l schools, the process ends in a maximum number
of l rounds.
9A major handicap of the Boston mechanism is that it leads to preference
manipulation.7 In fact, teachers are given incentives to rank high on their
submitted preferences the schools where they have good chances of getting
in. This has two important consequences. First, evaluating the performance
of this mechanism according to the revealed preferences is clearly inadequate.
Moreover, even though the outcome of the Boston mechanism is Pareto ef-
￿cient when teachers submit their true preferences, preference manipulation
may lead to a substantial e¢ ciency loss. Hence, we expect high rates of pref-
erence manipulation and a low level of achieved e¢ ciency. Moreover, as the
mechanism is not stable, the GS mechanism should outperform the Boston
mechanism in this aspect as well.
3 Experimental Design
These experiments were designed to analyze participants￿decision making
in di⁄erent informational settings under each of the above described match-
ing mechanisms: the Boston, the GS, and the TTC mechanisms. We use
a 3x4 design: for each mechanism we construct four treatments di⁄ering in
the amount of information held by participants about the elements of the
game. We then compare decision making throughout the treatments, con-
centrating on the role of information in truthful preference revelation, in the
achieved level of e¢ ciency, and in stability. The environment is designed to
capture the key aspects and di¢ culties of each mechanism, under a controlled
environment, with relatively small groups of participants.
Participants were randomly and anonymously sorted into groups of ￿ve.
Each participant plays the role of a teacher to be assigned to a teaching
position. For each group of ￿ve teachers, there are ￿ve vacancies￿ or teaching
positions￿ across three schools that di⁄er in capacity (number of opening
positions) and desirability. Each position should be assigned to one teacher
only. Preferences over schools are induced by the monetary payo⁄ a teacher
obtains depending on the school where she ￿lls a vacancy at the end of
the experiment. The payo⁄s obtained are symmetric: every teacher gets
15 experimental currency units (ECU) for her top choice, 9 ECU for the
second choice, and 3 ECU for the last choice, but di⁄erent teachers need
not agree on which school is either her top, second, or last choice. In the
experiment, 1 ECU equals 0.5 Euro. The payo⁄s of di⁄erent outcomes are
su¢ ciently dispersed so as to have a monetarily salient di⁄erence (12 ECU,
which equals 6 Euro) between getting one￿ s best and one￿ s worst choice.
7In Chen and S￿nmez (2006) approximately 80% of the subjects manipulate their true
preferences.
10Finally, schools have priorities over teachers. This means that schools may
prefer some applicants to others and are able to rank all the participants
in a list of priorities. Moreover, as the priorities of the schools are given,
schools are not real strategic agents (i.e., they "play" truthfully) and all the
participants know this.
3.1 Informational Settings
In each experimental session one of the di⁄erent informational treatments
is implemented for one of the three mechanisms. The four informational
settings are the following:
￿ Zero information setting: Each participant knows her possible pay-
o⁄ amounts depending on the school where she holds a position (i.e.,
her own induced preferences), but not the other participants￿prefer-
ences. She is only told that di⁄erent participants might have di⁄erent
payo⁄ tables.
Participants have no information about the schools￿priority ordering
in this treatment. They are only told each school￿ s capacity (i.e., its
number of vacancies).
￿ Low information setting: Besides her own induced preferences and
the capacity of each school, each participant knows for which school
she is the favorite candidate.
￿ Partial information setting: Each participant knows her own in-
duced preferences, capacities, and the favorite candidates of all schools,
up to their capacities.
￿ Full information setting: Each participant has complete information
on both the induced preferences of all participants and the full priority
ordering of schools over candidates.
In the case of the TTC mechanism, as the schools￿priority orderings are
re￿ ected in the tentative assignments, under the low information treatment
each participant is told￿ besides her own induced preferences and schools￿
capacities￿ her own tentative assignment, while in the partial information
treatment each participant is aware of all the participants￿tentative assign-
ments and in the full information treatment she also knows the induced
preferences of all the participants.
We conducted 12 sessions with undergraduate students from the Univer-
sitat Aut￿noma de Barcelona, recruited via e-mail using the web-based on-
line recruitment system for Economic Experiments (ORSEE, Greiner, 2004),
11where the experimental sessions (on paper/by hand) took place. In total,
435 subjects have participated in the experiment. Each treatment was im-
plemented in a di⁄erent session, therefore each subject was allowed to par-
ticipate in one session only. In each session we had 45 subjects (9 groups)
participating, except for the session where treatment B0 was implemented,
where only 30 subjects (6 groups) participated. Subjects were informed that
they would participate in a decision making task. At the beginning of each
session, subjects were randomly seated at the tables and printed instructions
were given to them. Once everybody was seated, instructions were read aloud
and questions were answered privately. In each session subjects were asked to
submit a school ordering, from their top to their last choice. Once everybody
made her decision and the answer sheets were collected, subjects were asked
to recall their submitted ordering and give a brief explanation of why they
chose the given ranking.8 In the meanwhile, each participant￿ s ￿nal matching
was determined and ￿nally earnings were paid. Sessions lasted about 45-60
minutes and average net payments￿ including a 2 Euro show-up fee￿ were
around 7,5 Euro.
The instructions and Decision Sheets in English for the GS mechanism
can be found in the Appendix.9
4 Experimental Results
In this section we present our experimental results. Our aim is to analyze how
the level of information participants hold a⁄ects the decision making process
and consequently the properties of the three matching mechanisms. The ￿rst
keypoint is related to whether individuals report their preferences truthfully.
We investigate whether the amount of information given to participants in￿ u-
ences the rate of truthful preference revelation (keeping the mechanism under
analysis ￿xed) and, additionally, whether under the same informational set-
ting truth-telling changes with the implemented mechanism. Second, given
the reported preferences, we compare e¢ ciency levels under each mechanism
across informational settings, as well as across mechanisms for each informa-
tion level. Finally, we examine the performance of each mechanism and the
in￿ uence of the amount of information on the proportion of stable outcomes
8Subjects were not informed about this additional task in advance not to interfere with
their decisions. On the other hand, this additional task was not compulsory (even though
around 90% of the participants decided to do it).
9The instructions for the other mechanisms only di⁄er in the description of the allo-
cation method. The Decision Sheets for players in di⁄erent roles look similar to the ones
shown in the Appendix.
12obtained.
4.1 Truthful Preference Revelation
Table 1 presents the proportion of participants who played truthfully (re-
garding induced preferences) and of those who used three possible kinds of
preference manipulation.
Mechanism Info Not. Truth PSB SSB PSB&SSB Other
Boston Zero B0 86,7% - 10,0% - 3,3%
Low B0.5 62,2% 11,1% 0,0% 15,6% 11,1%
Partial B1 46,7% 15,6% 13,3% 15,6% 8,9%
Full B2 46,7% 22,2% 6,7% 15,6% 8,9%
GS Zero GS0 82,2% - 4,4% - 13,3%
Low GS0.5 75,6% 4,4% 0,0% 6,7% 13,3%
Partial GS1 66,7% 13,3% 0,0% 20,0% 0,0%
Full GS2 66,7% 17,8% 2,2% 8,9% 4,4%
TTC Zero TTC0 95,6% - 2,2% - 2,2%
Low TTC0.5 82,2% 6,7% 0,0% 6,7% 4,4%
Partial TTC1 75,6% 4,4% 0,0% 11,1% 8,9%
Full TTC2 86,7% 6,7% 2,2% 2,2% 2,2%
Table 1: Proportion of truthful play and preference manipulations
The proportion of players who played truthfully varies between 46,7% and
95,6%, depending on the treatment being implemented. Note that, even
though the GS and the TTC mechanisms are strategy-proof, there is some
misrepresentation of preferences under these mechanisms. It is thus im-
portant to examine who manipulates the preferences and in which manner.
Based on the explanations given by the subjects, we have identi￿ed three
possible ways of preference manipulation. First, a substantial proportion of
the participants has ranked the school where they have priority higher in the
submitted ranking than it would be according to the induced preferences; this
is what we call the "Priority School Bias" (PSB).10 The second identi￿ed way
of manipulating the true preferences is to underrank the most competitive
school (i.e., the school with only one vacancy); following Chen and S￿nmez
(2006) we name this form of behavior "Small School Bias" (SSB). The third
manipulation method (PSB&SSB) is simply the simultaneous use of both
previously described ways.11 We can see that a relatively small proportion of
10In the case of the zero information setting it does not make sense to check for this kind
of preference manipulation, as participants in these settings have no information about
the priorities of the schools.
11For the reasons above, in the zero information setting it does not make sense to check
for this kind of manipulation.
13the participants used the SSB method, although when comparing the average
net payo⁄ of the subjects who manipulate their preferences, we ￿nd that it
yields a higher payo⁄ (11 ECU) than the other two methods. The average
payo⁄s obtained with the PSB and the PSB&SSB methods (8,7 ECU and 8,5
ECU respectively) suggest that these methods are used as means to ensure
their second best payo⁄ (9 ECU). This form of behavior can be considered
as a kind of risk aversion, since it allows the participants to avoid their worst
payo⁄ (3 ECU). Our data also shows that preference manipulation yields
higher payo⁄s under the Boston mechanism (9,9 ECU) than under any of
the other two, strategy-proof, mechanisms (8,5 ECU).
In order to analyze whether the quantity of information participants hold
a⁄ects behavior, we compare the proportion of participants playing truthfully
in di⁄erent informational settings under each mechanism.
Result 1: Under each mechanism, having no information about the other
parties￿preferences results in a signi￿cantly higher proportion of subjects re-
vealing their true preferences than having some additional information, while
there is no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence among the treatments where
agents hold low, partial, and full information.
Statistical evidence. Under each mechanism, the null hypothesis of equal
proportions of truthful preference revelation across the four informational
settings can be rejected at the 5% signi￿cance level. As the null hypotheses
are rejected, multiple comparisons are made. Some di⁄erences in the pro-
portion of truth-telling across information settings and the p-values of the
signi￿cance t-tests of di⁄erences can be found in Table 2. For conciseness, we
omit all tests involving the low information treatment, noting that the values
obtained are very close to those of the partial information treatment.12
Mechanism
B0-B1 B0-B2 B2-B1 GS0-GS1 GS0-GS2 GS1-GS2 TTC0-TTC1 TTC0-TTC2 TTC2-TTC1
Difference 40,0% 40,0% 0,0% 15,6% 15,6% 0,0% 20,0% 8,9% 11,1%
(0,00) (0,00) (1,00) (0,05) (0,05) (1,0) (0,01) (0,14) (0,18)
Table 2: Difference in the proportion of truthtelling across information settings and p-values of the significance t-tests of
differences
Boston GS TTC
Result 2: Across mechanisms there is a signi￿cant di⁄erence in the pro-
portion of truth-telling. In particular, in the zero and the full information
settings, the TTC mechanism performs better than the GS and Boston mech-
anisms and, in the low, partial, and full information settings, the proportion
of truth-telling under both GS or TTC is higher than under the Boston mech-
anism.
12This information is available upon request.
14Statistical evidence. Under each informational settings, the null hypoth-
esis of equal proportions of truthful preference revelation across the three
matching mechanisms can be rejected at the 5% signi￿cance level. As the
null hypotheses are rejected, multiple comparisons are made. Some di⁄er-
ences in the proportion of truth-telling across mechanisms and the p-values
of the signi￿cance t-tests of di⁄erences can be found in Table 3.13
Info
B0-GS0 TTC0-B0 TTC0-GS0 GS1-B1 TTC1-B1 TTC1-GS1 GS2-B2 TTC2-B2 TTC2-GS2
Difference 4,4% 8,9% 13% 20,0% 28,9% 8,9% 20,0% 40,0% 20,0%
(0,3) (0,08) (0,047) (0,03) (0,00) (0,355) (0,03) (0,00) (0,03)
Zero Partial Full
Table 3: Difference in the proportion of truth-telling across mechanisms and p-values of the significance
t-test of differences
To summarize our results regarding truth-telling, in lack of any informa-
tion about the other participants￿payo⁄s and preferences agents are much
more likely to revert to truth-telling. This suggests that complete ignorance
can be very convenient in this setting. Still, this does not make the TTC any
less desirable: even under complete ignorance, the TTC mechanism outper-
forms the GS mechanism, which in turn results as successful as the Boston
mechanism in what playing truthfully is concerned. In the settings where
agents have additional information about the elements of the game, the TTC
mechanism performs clearly better in revealing preferences straightforwardly
than the Boston mechanism, and at least as well as the GS mechanism.
4.2 E¢ ciency
We now investigate mechanism e¢ ciency in the di⁄erent information scenar-
ios. As we know, there is a strong link between preference manipulation and
e¢ ciency: even when the mechanism used is Pareto e¢ cient￿ in terms of the
revealed preferences￿ strategic behavior may lead to ine¢ cient allocations.
In calculating e¢ ciency levels we use the following de￿nitions. The e¢ -
ciency of a group of participants is calculated as the ratio of the sum of the
actual earnings of the members of the group and the Pareto-optimal earn-
ings of the group. The e¢ ciency of a treatment is simply the average of
the e¢ ciency of all the groups. Table 4 shows the average e¢ ciency of each
treatment.
13Once more, results concerning the low information treatment, which resembles the
partial information setting, were omitted but are available upon request.
15Mechanism
Info setting B0 B0.5 B1 B2 GS0 GS0.5 GS1 GS2 TTC0 TTC0.5 TTC1 TTC2
Efficiency 92,8% 87,4% 73,9% 80,7% 86,5% 88,4% 69,1% 78,7% 95,2% 87,4% 86,5% 91,3%
Boston GS TTC
Table 4: Average efficiency
Our ￿rst question regarding e¢ ciency is whether some informational set-
tings yield higher e¢ ciency levels than others. After this, we will turn our
attention to the e¢ ciency di⁄erences that may arise as a result of the di⁄erent
characteristics of the implemented mechanisms.
Result 3: Under the Boston and GS mechanisms the amount of informa-
tion has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the average e¢ ciency achieved by participants,
while under the TTC mechanism average e¢ ciency does not depend on the
implemented information setting. In particular, under the Boston and GS
mechanisms, having either no or a low level of information about the other
parties￿preferences results in a signi￿cantly higher average e¢ ciency than
when participants hold partial information. On the other hand, there is no
signi￿cant di⁄erence in the e¢ ciency achieved under any mechanism between
the partial and full information treatments.
Statistical evidence. The pairwise di⁄erences in average e¢ ciency across
information settings and the p-values of the signi￿cance (permutation) tests
of di⁄erences can be found in Table 5:14
Mechanism
B0-B1 B0-B2 B2-B1 GS0-GS1 GS0-GS2 GS2-GS1 TTC0-TTC1 TTC0-TTC2 TTC2-TTC1
Difference 18,9% 12,1% 6,8% 17,4% 8% 9,7% 8,7% 3,9% 4,8%
(0,005) (0,05) (0,288) (0,044) (0,317) (0,203) (0,194) (0,524) (0,536)
Table 5: Difference in the proportion of average efficiency across information settings and p-values of the significance
(permutation) tests of differences
Boston GS TTC
Under the TTC mechanism the null hypothesis of equal average e¢ ciency
across information settings can not be rejected. So, in this case￿ although
there is a signi￿cant di⁄erence in the truthful preference revelation when com-
paring truthfulness between the zero and the partial information settings￿
there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the average e¢ ciency of the four treat-
ments at any reasonable signi￿cance level.
Result 4: In the partial and in the full information treatments, the aver-
age e¢ ciency under the TTC mechanism is signi￿cantly higher than under
14The results concerning the low information treatment were again omitted, as they are
similar to those obtained for the zero information treatment. All tests are available upon
request.
16any of the other mechanisms. On the other hand, there is no signi￿cant dif-
ference in average e¢ ciency between the mechanisms in either the zero or
low information settings.
Statistical evidence. Table 6 shows the di⁄erences in average e¢ ciency
across mechanisms and the p-values of the signi￿cance (permutation) tests
of di⁄erences.15
Info
B0-GS0 TTC0-B0 TTC0-GS0 B1-GS1 TTC1-B1 TTC1-GS1 B2-GS2 TTC2-B2 TTC2-GS2
Difference 6,3% 2,4% 9% 4,8% 12,6% 17,4% 1,9% 10,6% 12,6%
(0,514) (0,722) (0,155) (0,552) (0,09) (0,044) (0,858) (0,07) (0,046)
Full
Table 6: Difference in the  proportion of average efficiency across mechanisms and p-values of the significance (permutation) tests
of differences
Partial Zero
Another way to evaluate the performance of a mechanism is to consider
the proportion of participants who obtain their top choices. For this purpose,
it might be tempting to use the reported preferences, so that a high fraction
of participants receiving their submitted top choice would suggest that the
mechanism performs well.16 However, as we have seen above, a substantial
proportion of participants manipulate their preferences, so that in order to
get a more accurate depiction of the performance of each mechanism in each
information setting, it is worth to examine the proportion of participants
who get their true top choices.
Result 5a: Under the Boston and the GS mechanisms, in the low, par-
tial, and full information settings, there is a highly signi￿cant di⁄erence be-
tween the proportion of participants who receive their reported top choice and
those who receive their true top choice. Under the TTC this di⁄erence is only
signi￿cant in the low and partial information setting.
Statistical evidence. Table 7 shows the di⁄erence between the proportion
of subjects who got assigned their reported top choice and of those who
actually got their true top choice, as well as the corresponding p-values of
15The low information treatment resembles the zero information treatment and was,
thus, excluded. All values are available upon request.
16From this point of view, the results in this experiment suggest that all mechanisms
are similar: there is no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence in the proportion of reported
top choices obtained across mechanisms. Moreover, under each mechanism, there is no
signi￿cant di⁄erence across information settings.
17the t-tests of proportions.
Mechanism
Info setting B0 B0.5 B1 B2 GS0 GS0.5 GS1 GS2 TTC0 TTC0.5 TTC1 TTC2
Reported top choice 83,3% 88,9% 73,3% 77,8% 71,1% 75,6% 64,4% 75,6% 77,8% 71,1% 77,8% 71,1%
True top choice 76,7% 53,3% 44,4% 46,7% 55,6% 53,3% 35,6% 44,4% 73,3% 53,3% 57,8% 66,7%
Difference 6,7% 35,6% 28,9% 31,1% 15,6% 22,2% 28,9% 31,1% 4,4% 17,8% 20,0% 4,4%
(0,52) (0,00) (0,01) (0,003) (0,129) (0,03) (0,01) (0,003) (0,625) (0,085) (0,045) (0,65)
Boston GS TTC
Table 7: Proportions of the reported and the true top choices, differences between them, and the corresponding p-values of the
significance t-tests of differences
While in the zero information setting there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence be-
tween the proportion of subjects who get their reported top choices and the
ones who get their true top choices, in the low, partial, and full information
settings, under the Boston and the GS mechanisms, the null hypothesis of
equal proportions can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of
the percentage of reported top choices being higher than the percentage of
true top choices. Under the TTC mechanism, the same null can be rejected
in the low and partial information settings.
Result 5b: The amount of information has an important e⁄ect on the
proportion of subjects who receive their true top choices. In particular, under
the Boston and the GS mechanisms, a signi￿cantly higher number of partici-
pants get their true top choices in the zero information treatment than when
holding some information on the elements of the game. The TTC mechanism
is not sensitive to the amount of information and prevails over GS in what
the assignment of the true top choices is considered.
Statistical evidence. Table 8 reports the di⁄erences in the proportion
of subjects who receive their true top choices across information settings
(upper half) and across mechanisms (lower half), as well as the corresponding
p-values of the signi￿cance t-tests for di⁄erences.
Mechanism
B0-B1 B0-B2 B2-B1 GS0-GS1 GS0-GS2 GS2-GS1 TTC0-TTC1 TTC0-TTC2 TTC2-TTC1
Difference 32,2% 30,0% 2,2% 20,0% 11,1% 8,9% 15,6% 6,7% 8,9%
(0,003) (0,006) (0,833) (0,055) (0,292) (0,39) (0,12) (0,49) (0,385)
Info setting
B0-GS0 B0-TTC0TTC0-GS0 B1-GS1 TTC1-B1 TTC1-GS1 B2-GS2 TTC2-B2 TTC2-GS2
Difference 21,1% 3,3% 17,8% 8,9% 13,3% 22,2% 2,2% 20,0% 22,2%
(0,052) (0,74) (0,076) (0,39) (0,205) (0,033) (0,833) (0,053) (0,032)
Table 8: Difference in the proportion of participants who got their true top choice, across information settings and across
mechanisms, and p-values of the significance t- tests of differences
Boston GS TTC
Zero Partial Full
The above results indicate that the TTC is more e¢ cient than both the
GS and the Boston mechanisms, which con￿rms theory and contrasts with
18the e¢ ciency reversal result obtained in Chen and S￿nmez (2006). In fact,
while in Chen and S￿nmez (2006) a substantial proportion of agents manip-
ulate their preferences under TTC and, as a consequence, the GS emerges
as more e¢ cient, in this experiment many participants have recognized the
strategy of truth-telling as dominant under TTC, leading to comparable rates
of manipulation under both mechanisms. Another advantage of the TTC
mechanism unveiled above is that the proportion of subjects who get their
true top choice under the TTC is signi￿cantly higher than under the GS
mechanism. On the other hand, e¢ ciency levels and the fraction of subjects
obtaining their true top choices under the TTC appear to be less depen-
dent on the level of information participants hold, when compared to what is
achieved under either Boston or GS. Finally, the Boston mechanism is more
e¢ cient than we could reasonably expect; this is due to the fact that a rel-
atively high number of participants reveal their true preferences under this
mechanism.
4.3 Stability
In what stability is concerned, a couple of remarks is in order. First, re-
call that the GS mechanism generates outcomes that are stable with re-
spect to the submitted preferences, while neither the Boston nor the TTC
mechanisms ful￿l this property. Second, the stability of an outcome is eval-
uated for the true preferences of the participants and schools￿priorities.17
Last, the average stability of a treatment is calculated simply as the propor-
tion of stable outcomes observed among all the realized matchings in that
treatment.
Our experimental data regarding the average stability of the treatments
is shown in Table 9.
Mechanism
Info setting B0 B0.5 B1 B2 GS0 GS0.5 GS1 GS2 TTC0 TTC0.5 TTC1 TTC2
Stable 16,7% 55,6% 11,1% 44,4% 55,6% 88,9% 77,8% 44,4% 11,1% 44,4% 22,2% 11,1%
Table 9: Proportion of stable outcomes
Boston GS TTC
An interesting feature of our results on stability is that although we could
expect the GS mechanism to yield the teachers￿optimal outcome, in the
partial information setting, 71% of the stable matchings turn out to be the
17The set of stable matchings is composed of the following outcomes: teachers 1 and
2 assigned to school B, 3 assigned to C, and 4 and 5 to A (the teachers￿optimal stable
matching); teacher 1 matched to B, 2 to A, 3 to C, 4 to A, and 5 to B; and ￿nally 1
assigned to B, 2 to A, 3 to B, 4 to A, and 5 to C (the schools￿optimal stable matching).
19schools￿optimal stable matching. This can be explained on account of the
substantial rate of manipulation under this treatment. Still, the theoretical
stability ranking between GS and TTC appears to hold empirically, as stated
in the following result.
Result 6: The amount of information has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on the
proportion of stable outcomes under any of the mechanisms. On the other
hand, the GS mechanism results to be more successful than the TTC mecha-
nism, but it only performs signi￿cantly better than the Boston mechanism in
the partial informational scenario.
Proof. Table 10 reports the di⁄erences in the proportion of stable matchings
across informational treatments (upper half) and across mechanisms (lower
half) and the p-values of the signi￿cance (Fisher￿ s exact) tests of di⁄erences.
Mechanism
B0-B1 B2-B0 B2-B1 GS1-GS0 GS0-GS2 GS1-GS2 TTC1-TTC0 TTC0-TTC2 TTC1-TTC2
Difference 5,6% 27,8% 33,3% 22,2% 11,1% 33,3% 11,1% 0,0% 11,1%
(1,0) (0,58) (0,29) (0,62) (1,0) (0,19) (1,0) (1,0) (1,0)
Info setting
GS0-B0 B0-TTC0GS0-TTC0 GS1-B1 TTC1-B1 GS1-TTC1 B2-GS2 B2-TTC2 GS2-TTC2
Difference 38,9% 5,6% 44,4% 66,7% 11,1% 55,6% 0,0% 33,3% 33,3%
(0,17) (1,0) (0,06) (0,01) (1,0) (0,03) (0,68) (0,29) (0,15)
Zero Partial Full
Boston GS TTC
Table 10: Difference in average stability across information settings and across mechanisms, and p-values of the significance
(Fisher's exact) tests of differences
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we examine a particular class of matching problems that is
closely related to the college admissions problem: the assignment of individu-
als to indivisible items. We analyze three well-known matching mechanisms￿
the Boston, the GS, and the TTC mechanisms￿ under di⁄erent informational
settings. Our experimental design allows us to explore two main questions.
First, we compare individuals￿decision making regarding truth-telling,
e¢ ciency, and stability across the three mechanisms, in each informational
setting. These results may serve as a test of the theoretical characteriza-
tion of the above mechanisms. Our results show that in both the zero and
full information settings, under the TTC mechanism, a signi￿cantly higher
proportion of participants plays truthfully than under either the Boston or
the GS mechanisms. In case the participants have some information about
the elements of the game, under the Boston mechanism a signi￿cantly higher
number of participants manipulate their preferences than under either the
20GS or the TTC mechanisms.18 That under complete ignorance we do not
￿nd a signi￿cant di⁄erence in truth-telling between the Boston and the GS
mechanisms is specially interesting as under the latter mechanism straight-
forward behavior is dominant. Regarding e¢ ciency, the experimental results
are in accordance with the predictions of the theory in the partial and full
information settings: here the TTC mechanism yields a signi￿cantly higher
e¢ ciency level than either the Boston or the GS mechanisms. On the other
hand, when participants have low information about the others￿preferences,
there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence between the achieved e¢ ciency across mech-
anisms.19 As for stability, the theoretical superiority of the GS mechanism
is only con￿rmed in the partial information treatment. In low information
treatments, even though the GS performs better than the TTC mechanism, it
is as successful as the Boston mechanism, while under complete information
there is no di⁄erence between the three mechanisms in what the proportion
of stable outcomes is concerned.20
Our second aim is to evaluate the in￿ uence of the amount of information
held by individuals on the decision making process under the three match-
ing mechanisms. The experimental results show that if participants have
no information about the others￿preferences they are more likely to play
truthfully than when holding some information, while there is no signi￿cant
di⁄erence in truth-telling under any of the mechanisms among settings where
agents hold some information.21 The amount of information plays a role in
the achieved e¢ ciency level as well. Under the Boston and the GS mecha-
nisms participants reach higher e¢ ciency levels in low information settings
than when holding partial information. While under the Boston mechanism
the e¢ ciency in the zero information setting is signi￿cantly higher than in
the full information setting, the same di⁄erence under the GS mechanism is
not signi￿cant. Under any of these two mechanisms, there is no signi￿cant
di⁄erence between the partial and the full information case. On the other
hand, under the TTC mechanism, the amount of information does not have a
signi￿cant e⁄ect on the achieved e¢ ciency level.22 Finally, in what stability
18Summarizing, the comparison of the proportions of truthtelling across mech-
anisms is the following: B0=GS0<TTC0; B0.5<GS0.5=TTC0.5; B1<GS1=TTC1;
B2<GS2<TTC2.
19Summarizing, the e¢ ciency levels across mechanisms are the following:
B0=GS0=TTC0; B0.5=GS0.5=TTC0.5; TTC1>B1=GS1; TTC2>B2=GS2.
20Summarizing, the results of stability across mechanisms are the following: GS0>TTC0,
GS0=B0, B0=TTC0; GS0.5=B0.5=TTC0.5; GS1>B1=TTC1; GS2=B2=TTC2.
21Summarizing, the proportion of truthtelling across informational settings is the follow-
ing: B0>B0.5=B1=B2; GS0>GS1=GS2, GS0=GS0.5, and GS0.5=GS1; TTC0=TTC0.5,
TTC0>TTC1, TTC0=TTC2, and TTC0.5=TTC1=TTC2.
22Summarizing, the e¢ ciency levels across informational settings are the following:
21is concerned, the information does not determine the proportion of stable
outcomes.23
Summarizing, we can conclude that the comparison of the mechanisms
points to the superiority of the TTC mechanism. Although regarding truthful
preference revelation￿ depending on the implemented informational setting￿
it may give similar results to the GS mechanism, in the achieved e¢ ciency
level the TTC mechanism performs clearly better than either the Boston or
the GS mechanisms. Moreover, we ￿nd that the amount of information may
play a role in participants￿decision making. In general we can say that if the
participants only know their own induced preferences, i.e., own payo⁄s, they
are more likely to play truthfully than in case of having additional informa-
tion. This results also in higher e¢ ciency levels under all mechanisms, except
for the TTC, where the amount of information has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on




6.1.1 Instructions for the Gale and Shapley Mechanism24
Thank you for participating in this experiment on decision making. From
now until the end of the session any communication with other participants
is forbidden. If you have any question, feel free to ask at any point of the
experiment. Please do so by raising your hand and one of us will come to
your desk to answer your question.
You and every other participant play the role of a teacher and have to
indicate a preference ordering over schools. We will form groups of ￿ve partic-
ipants, so that you will be grouped with 4 other participants, whose identity
you will not know. There are 3 schools (A, B, and C) and 5 teaching positions
available across them: two positions at schools A and B, and one position
at school C. Each of the ￿ve positions will be allocated to a participant,
based on the preference orderings submitted by the 5 participants of the
group. Besides di⁄ering in size (number of teaching positions), schools di⁄er
in location and quality. The desirability of schools in terms of location and
B0>B2=B1, B0=B0.5, B0.5>B1, and B0.5=B2; GS0=GS0.5>GS1, GS0.5>=GS2 and
GS0=GS2 and GS1=GS2; TTC0=TTC0.5=TTC1=TTC2.
23Our results on stability across information settings are: B0=B0.5=B1=B2;
GS0=GS0.5=GS1=GS2; TTC0=TTC0.5=TTC1=TTC2.
24These instructions correspond to the Full information condition.
22quality is summarized in the amounts shown in the payo⁄table (see Decision
Sheets), which contains the payo⁄ amounts in experimental currency units
(ECU) corresponding to each participant and school position. This matrix
is known by all the participants.
Submitted school ranking: During the experiment you will be asked
to complete the Decision Sheet by indicating the preference ordering over
schools you wish to submit. You have to rank every school. Once all partic-
ipants have completed their Decision Sheets, the experiment is ￿nished.
Priority ordering of schools: Schools when o⁄ering positions consider
the quality of each applicant and the experience they have. On this basis,
they build a priority ordering where all candidates are ranked. The follow-
ing table contains the priority ordering of each school (this is known by all
participants):
School A School B School C
1st choice 4 3 5
2nd choice 2 1 4
3rd choice 1 4 2
4th choice 5 5 3
5th choice 3 2 1
Payo⁄s: During the session you can earn money. You will receive 4 ECU
for your participation, in addition to the amount you earn in the experiment.
This amount is displayed in the payo⁄matrix, corresponding to the position
you hold at the end of the session. Note that the position you hold at the
end of the experiment depends on your submitted ordering and the submitted
ordering of the other participants of your group (which you do not know at
the moment of submitting your order).
Once the experiment has ￿nished and the allocations of the participants
are determined, each participant will get paid her total payo⁄ in euros. One
ECU equals 0,5 Euros.
Allocation Method: With this method, each participant is assigned a
position at the best possible school reported in her Decision Sheet that is
consistent with the priority ordering of schools. Given the submitted prefer-
ences of the participants and the priority ordering of each school, positions
are allocated in the following way:
23￿ An application to the ￿rst ranked school in the Decision Sheet is sent
for each participant.
￿ Each school accepts the applicants with higher priority order until posi-
tions are ￿lled, and keep them on hold, while rejects the lowest priority
students in excess of its capacity. Throughout the allocation process,
a school can hold no more applications than its number of positions!
￿ Whenever an applicant is rejected at a school, an application is sent to
the next highest school on his Decision Sheet.
￿ Whenever a school receives a new application (from an applicant that
has been rejected in a previous round by a better ranked school), these
applications are considered together with the (previously) retained ap-
plications for that school. Among the retained and new applicants,
the lowest priority ones in excess of the number of the positions are
rejected, while remaining applications are retained.
￿ This process is repeated until no more applications can be rejected, and
the allocation is ￿nalized; and each participant is assigned the position
at the school that holds her application at the end of the process.
An Example: We will go through a simple example to illustrate how the
allocation method works.
Applicants and schools: In this example there are four applicants (1 ￿4)
and three schools (A, B, C).
Positions: There are two positions at school B, and one each at A and C.
Submitted school ranking: Suppose the submitted school rankings of each
participant are the following:
Applicant 1 Applicant 2 Applicant 3 Applicant 4
1st choice A B C C
2nd choice C A B A
3rd choice B C A B
Schools￿priority ordering: Suppose the priority orderings of the schools
are:
24A B C
1st choice 2 1 1
2nd choice 4 2 3
3rd choice 1 4 4
4th choice 3 3 2
Allocation: This allocation method consists of the following rounds:
ROUND 1: Each applicant applies to her ￿rst choice:
￿Applicant 1 applies to School A, 2 to School B, and Applicants 3
and 4 to School C.
￿School A retains Applicant 1, School B retains Applicant 2; and
School C retains Applicant 3;
￿School C rejects Applicant 4, as it only has one position, and
School C prefers Applicant 3 to 4.
ROUND 2: The applicant who is rejected in ROUND 1 (4) applies to her second
choice:
￿Applicant 4 applies to School A.
￿School A compares Applicant 1 (retained in round 1) and 4, as it
only has one position free; and retains 4 and rejects now 1 (as in
School A￿ s preference ordering 4 has priority over 1).
ROUND 3: The applicant who is rejected in ROUND 2 (1) applies to her second
choice:
￿Applicant 1 applies to School C.
￿School C compares Applicant 3 (retained in round 1) and 1, as it
only has one position free. School C retains 1 and rejects now 3
(as in School C￿ s preference ordering 1 has priority over 3).
ROUND 4: The applicant who is rejected in ROUND 3 (3) applies to her second
choice:
￿Applicant 3 applies to School B.
￿School B retains Applicant 2 since the ￿rst round, but still has a
vacancy (as here there are two positions opening), therefore School
B accepts Applicant 3.
25Here the process ￿nishes, as there are no more rejections; and the ￿nal
allocations are:
Applicant 1 2 3 4
School C B B A
You will have 15 minutes to go over the instructions at your place, and
make your decision. Are there any questions?
6.1.2 Instructions for the TTC Mechanism25
(...)
Priority ordering of schools: Schools when o⁄ering positions consider
the quality of each applicant and the experience they have. On this basis,
each candidate is tentatively assigned to a school. This tentative assignment
is the following:
Applicant 1 2 3 4 5
School B A B A C
Allocation Method: In this process, initially each participant is tenta-
tively assigned to one of the opening positions and all participants are or-
dered in a queue based on a fair lottery. This means that each participant
has an equal chance of being ￿rst in the queue, second, ..., as well as the last
in the queue. Given the submitted preference orderings of the participants
and the order in the queue determined by the lottery, the allocation process
is the following:
￿ An application to the ￿rst ranked school in the Decision Sheet is sent
for the participant at the top of the queue.
￿If the application is submitted to the school to which this par-
ticipant was assigned initially, then her tentative assignment be-
comes her ￿nal position; and this participant and his position are
removed from the subsequent process. The process continues with
the next participant in the queue.
25In this Appendix we only include those parts of the original instructions that di⁄er
from the instructions of the Gale-Shapley mechanism.
26￿If the application is submitted to another school, say school S, then
the ￿rst participant who tentatively holds a position at school S is
moved to the top of the queue, directly in front of the requester.
￿ Whenever the queue is modi￿ed, the process continues in the way de-
scribed above. Now an application to the ￿rst ranked school in the
Decision Sheet is sent for the (new) participant at the top of the queue.
￿If the application is submitted to the school to which this partic-
ipant was assigned initially, etc...
￿If the application is submitted to another school, etc...
￿ A mutually-bene￿cial exchange is obtained when a cycle of applications
is made in sequence, which bene￿ts all a⁄ected participants; e.g., A
applies to B￿ s tentative position, B applies to C￿ s tentative position,
and C applies to A￿ s tentative position. In this case the exchange is
completed and all three participants as well as their assignments are
removed from the subsequent process.
￿ The process continues till all participants are assigned a position.
An Example: (...)
Priority queue of applicants: Suppose the lottery gave the following pri-
ority ordering: 1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿4.
Tentative assignment: Suppose the initial (tentative) assignment of posi-
tions is the following:
Applicant 1 2 3 4
School B C B A
Allocation: The allocation method consists of the following process:
Step 1: The ￿rst applicant in the queue (1) applies to her best choice, to School
A, however, the only position here is tentatively held by participant 4.
So participant 4 is moved to the top of the queue.
Step 2: The new queue is now 4 ￿1 ￿2 ￿3. Participant 4 ranked School C as
her top choice, but the only position of this school is tentatively held
by participant 2. Therefore 2 is moved to the top of the queue.
27Step 3: The new queue is now 2 ￿4 ￿1 ￿3. Participant 2 ranked School B as
her top choice, but the two positions at school B are tentatively held
by participant 1 and 3. As 1 has priority over 3 (as she is in front of 3
in the queue), participant 1 is moved to the top of the queue.
Step 4: The new queue is now 1 ￿2 ￿4 ￿3. Remember, that applicant 1
has ranked School A as her best choice. A cycle of participants is now
made in sequence in the last three steps: 1 applied to the tentative
assignment of 4, 4 applied to the tentative assignment of 2, and 2
applied to the tentative assignment of 1. These mutually bene￿ciary
changes are made: 1 gets the position in School A, 2 gets one of the
two positions in School B, and 4 gets the position in School C. These
participants and their assignments are removed from the process.
Step 5: The only participant left to be assigned is 3. As the only school with
available position is School B and this position is tentatively assigned
to her, it becomes her ￿nal assignment. The allocation process ends.
The ￿nal allocations are:
Applicant 1 2 3 4
School A B B C
(...)
6.1.3 Instructions for the Boston Mechanism26
(...)
Allocation Method: Given the submitted preferences of the participants
and the priority ordering of each school, positions are allocated in the fol-
lowing way (in max. 3 rounds):
ROUND 1: ￿An application to the ￿rst ranked school in the Decision Sheet is
sent for each participant.
￿Each school accepts the participants with higher priority order
until positions are ￿lled. These
applicants and their positions are removed from the system. All other
applications are rejected by the schools.
26In this Appendix we only include those parts of the original instructions that di⁄er
from the instructions of the Gale-Shapley mechanism.
28ROUND 2: ￿The applicants remaining in the system send the application to
their second ranked position in the Decision Sheet.
￿If a school still has available positions remaining from Round 1,
then it accepts the applicant with higher priority order until all
positions are ￿lled. The remaining applications are rejected.
ROUND 3: Each remaining participant is assigned a position at her last choice.
An Example: (...)
Submitted school ranking: Suppose the school rankings submitted by
each participant are the following:
Applicant 1 Applicant 2 Applicant 3 Applicant 4
1st choice A A A B
2nd choice B C C C
3rd choice C B B A
Schools￿priority ordering: Suppose the priority orderings of the schools
are:
A B C
1st choice 1 1 2
2nd choice 2 3 3
3rd choice 3 4 4
4th choice 4 2 1
Allocation: This allocation method consists of the following rounds:
ROUND 1:
￿ Each applicant applies to her ￿rst choice:
￿Applicants 1, 2, and 3 apply to School A, Applicant 4 to School
B.
￿School A accepts Applicant 1 (its ￿rst choice)
￿School B accepts Applicant 4
￿ Accepted applicants (1 and 4) and schools without remaining positions
(School A) are removed from the subsequent process.
ROUND 2:
29￿ Each applicant who is rejected in ROUND 1 (2 and 3) applies to her
second choice:
￿Applicants 2 and 3 apply to School C.
￿School C accepts Applicant 2 (its ￿rst choice)
￿ Accepted applicants (2) and schools without remaining positions (School
C) are removed from the subsequent process.
ROUND 3:
￿ Each remaining applicant who is rejected in the previous rounds (3) is
assigned her last choice:
￿Applicant 3 gets the remaining position in School B.
Based on this method, the ￿nal allocations are:
Applicant 1 2 3 4
School A C B B
(...)
6.2 Decision Sheets
6.2.1 Decision Sheet for GS Mechanism Under the Zero Informa-
tion Treatment27
You are participant 2.
Recall: Your payo⁄ amount depends on the school position you hold at
the end of the experiment. Your possible payo⁄ amounts are outlined in the
following table:
Position received at school A B C
Your payoff 9 15 3
This means, that if at the end of the experiment you hold a position:
￿ ￿at school A, you will be paid 9 ECU;
27The same Decision Sheet was used in the corresponding information treatment of the
Boston mechanism as well.
30￿at school B, you will be paid 15 ECU;
￿at school C, you will be paid 3 ECU.
Recall: Di⁄erent participants might have di⁄erent payo⁄ tables.
Recall: There are two positions opening at schools A and B, and one at
school C.
Priority ordering of schools: You have no information about the prefer-
ences of the schools. This means, that if at the end of the experiment you
hold a position:
Please submit your ranking of the schools (A through C) from your ￿rst
choice to your last choice. Please rank EVERY school!
1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice
This is the end of the experiment. Please wait until everybody ￿nishes
and you are told your result.
6.2.2 Decision Sheet for GS Mechanism Under the Partial Infor-
mation Treatment28
You are participant 2.
Recall: Your payo⁄ amount depends on the school position you hold at
the end of the experiment. Your possible payo⁄ amounts are outlined in the
following table:
Position received at school A B C
Your payoff 9 15 3
This means, that if at the end of the experiment you hold a position:
￿ ￿at school A, you will be paid 9 ECU;
￿at school B, you will be paid 15 ECU;
28The same Decision Sheet was used in the corresponding information treatment of the
Boston mechanism as well.
31￿at school C, you will be paid 3 ECU.
Recall: Di⁄erent participants might have di⁄erent payo⁄ tables.
Recall: There are two positions opening at schools A and B, and one at
school C.
Priority ordering of schools: Information about the priorities:
￿ ￿at school A participant 2 (you) and 4 have priority;
￿at school B participant 1 and 3 have priority;
￿at school C participant 5 has priority.
Please submit your ranking of the schools (A through C) from your ￿rst
choice to your last choice. Please rank EVERY school!
1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice
This is the end of the experiment. Please wait until everybody ￿nishes
and you are told your result.
6.2.3 Decision Sheet for GS Mechanism Under the Full Informa-
tion Treatment
You are participant 2.
Recall: Each participant￿ s payo⁄ amount depends on the school position
she holds at the end of the experiment. The possible payo⁄amounts for each
participant are known by everybody and these are outlined in the following
table:
Position received at school A B C
Payoff of participant 1 3 9 15
Payoff of participant 2 (YOU) 9 15 3
Payoff of participant 3 15 3 9
Payoff of participant 4 15 3 9
Payoff of participant 5 15 9 3
This means, that for example, if at the end of the experiment:
32￿ ￿participant 1 and participant 5 hold a position at school A, partic-
ipant 3 and 4 hold a position at school B, and you hold a position
at school C, the payo⁄s would be the following:
￿participant 1 would be paid 3 ECU; participant 5 would get 15
ECU; participant 3 would get 3 ECU; participant 4 would get 3
ECU; and you would get 3 ECU.
Recall: There are two positions opening at schools A and B, and one at
school C.
Priority ordering of the schools: The complete priority ordering of the
schools is known by each participant, and is shown in the following table:
School A School B School C
1st choice 4 3 5
2nd choice 2 1 4
3rd choice 1 4 2
4th choice 5 5 3
5th choice 3 2 1
Please submit your ranking of the schools (A through C) from your ￿rst
choice to your last choice. Please rank EVERY school!
1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice
This is the end of the experiment. Please wait until everybody ￿nishes
and you are told your result.
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